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Abstract   This thesis studies if and when the size of the financial sectors starts to have a 
negative effect on economic growth. The size of the financial sector is modelled using employment in 
the sector. The study uses a panel data model with the EU15 countries covering the years from 1970 to 
2007 (1985 to 2005 for some regressions). The results show that the positive contribution to growth of 
labour and skill allocated in the financial sector is diminishing, and that the diminishing aspect 
primarily acts through productivity. The effect does, however, not become negative.  
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1. Introduction 
As early as in 1984, Tobin (p.14) argued: “…we are throwing more and more of our resources, 
including the cream of our youth, into financial activities remote from the production of goods and 
services, into activities that generate high private rewards disproportionate to their social 
productivity.” Considering the recent expansion of the financial sector and its increasing use of skilled 
labour it begs the question of whether the concerns of Tobin have come true.  
This thesis examines the relationship between the size of the financial sector and economic 
growth. The results show that the employment share allocated to the financial sector has a positive but 
diminishing relationship with the economic growth going through productivity. A similar diminishing 
relationship is found between the allocation of skill to the financial sector and growth. 
The idea that the financial sector provides services that facilitate both productivity and growth is 
old, and has among others been presented by Schumpeter (1911). This was later backed up by the 
pioneering work of Goldsmith (1969) showing a positive correlation between the size of the financial 
sector and economic growth. A correlation does, however, not mean that finance causes growth, i.e. 
the relationship could very well go the opposite direction. Evidence of finance being an indicator of 
economic growth was first shown by King and Levine (1993), and strong indications of causality 
going from financial sector size to economic growth have thereafter been found (e.g. Beck, Levine, 
and Loayza, 2000, Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). While the issue of 
causality has not been fully resolved, the general consensus in modern economics is that the financial 
sector indeed contributes to economic growth (Levine, 2005).  
Following the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 and the ensuing financial crisis, 
representatives of financial authorities have, nonetheless, expressed their concern regarding the current 
size of the financial sector (e.g. Turner, 2010, Smaghi, 2010). Several studies indicate that these 
concerns are not unfounded as it seems as if the financial sector might very well become inefficiently 
large in comparison to other sectors (Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza, 2015, Law and Singh, 2014, 
Samargandi, Firdmuc, and Ghosh, 2015). These studies, however, measure the size of the financial 
sector by its services of intermediation, which severely limits their ability to explain what lies behind 
the apparent oversize of finance that they find.  
Potential brain drain from productive and innovative sectors has been laid forward as a potential 
cause (e.g. Kneer, 2013a, Kneer 2013b, Cecchetti and Kharoubi, 2012). The idea is that the financial 
sector serves as a force of attraction of skilled labour by having a wage premium. Skilled labour can 
potentially be better at allocating credit and thereby increase economic growth when allocated to the 
financial sector. This drain of talent away from innovative sectors is nonetheless thought to eventually 
decrease growth as less technological advancements will be made.  
This thesis attempts to combine two ideas of the potentially oversized financial sector with its 
possible cause, the misallocation of talent. It does this by using variables that one would normally 
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assume to be connected to brain drain of labour with testing techniques used by previous research that 
have found the financial sector to be too large in many countries. The variables that are used are the 
share of employment, a measurement of the skill usage of finance relative to other sectors, the share of 
value added, and a measurement of the skill premium of finance. Both the share of employment and 
the share of value added directly measure the size of the financial sector. The share of employment 
does, however, also directly measure brain drain, while the share of value added focuses on the 
attraction force of finance through income. Similarly a measurement of the skill intensity captures the 
relative usage of talent of the financial sector, while the skill premium measures how strong the 
attraction force is that finance exerts on talent. The oversized financial sector phenomena is captured 
by regressing both a linear term capturing the positive effect of finance, and a quadratic term that 
captures the negative aspects of finance. This approach allows for the identification of a threshold 
where the financial sector occupies too much labour and skill in the economy. The variables are then 
regressed on GDP per capita growth and productivity growth. Using two explained variables to 
capture the effect of the financial sector on the macro-level means that the thesis sheds some light on 
through what channels this effect goes through.  
It is found that the financial sector can become too big and stop contributing to economic 
growth. This is observed when regressing the labour allocation to finance on productivity growth. In 
the same way the skill intensity of the financial sector can stop affecting productivity growth when it 
expands too much. These effects are not found to be as strong when regressing the two variables on 
GDP per capita growth. This indicates that the brain drain mainly affects innovative sectors which has 
also been found in previous research (Kneer 2013a, 2013b). The two measurements of the attraction 
force of the financial sector do not show the similar effect on the aggregate. This could mean that the 
income of the financial sector does not affect the economy, neither positively nor negatively, and that 
the drain of personnel to the financial sector is poorly represented by changes in financial sector 
income. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the hypotheses and reviews the literature 
regarding both the positive and negative effects of finance on the aggregate level. Thereafter chapter 3 
firstly gives the methodology that was used to define the variables and econometric models of the 
thesis. Secondly the sources of data are briefly discussed. Thirdly the results of the thesis are presented 
and various causes and implications of the result are analysed. Furthermore, the robustness of the 
results are considered. Lastly chapter 4 contains a short summary and an overall conclusion of the 
results.   
 
2. The Relationship between Finance and Growth 
The financial sector provides several important functions in the economy that increases economic 
growth (see e.g. Levine, 2005 for a review of literature). Through intermediation the financial sector 
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improves the allocation of funds in the economy thus improving the allocation of capital and fostering 
innovation. The financial sector also provides a monitoring function, which increases the incentives 
for sound management. Additionally, the financial sector can reduce the risk of investors and direct 
funds to high risk high reward investments by enabling diversification. There are, however, indications 
that the benefit of the financial sector might have decreasing returns to scale (Rioja and Valev 2004a), 
or that its impact could even hurt the long term economic growth if allowed to grow too large (e.g. 
Arcand et al. 2015, Law and Singh, 2014).  
Several factors may lie behind the potential negative impact of finance. Firstly, the contribution 
of the financial sector depends greatly on whether credit goes to enterprises or households (Angeles, 
2015, Beck, Büyükkarabacak, Rioja, and Valev, 2012). Secondly, the financial sector is often 
associated with financial volatility (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012, Shleifer and Vishny, 2010) 
which often has macroeconomic consequences.  Thirdly, the financial sector might also drain talent 
from innovative sectors, consequently reducing the rate of innovations (e.g. Bolton, Santos, and 
Scheinkman 2011, Kneer 2013b). Since innovation often is considered the engine of long-run growth, 
this last downside of the financial sector is of particular interest. 
This thesis will attempt to combine the idea that the financial sector might become too large, 
with the ideas of misallocation of talent away from innovative industries. Subsequently the hypothesis 
is the following:       
Hypothesis: The financial sector exerts a positive impact on economic growth. The 
marginal effect of a greater financial sector is, however, negative and the effect of 
the financial sector turns negative after a given threshold.  
2.1 Positive Effects 
The financial sector has a positive impact on economic growth through intermediation. The financial 
sector does this, by acting as a market place were funds can be reallocated, and by compensating for 
informational asymmetries between economic actors (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1986). Thereby the 
financial sector improves the allocation of funds in the economy and indirectly increases economic 
growth. At the same time economic growth increases individual wealth, allowing more persons to be 
able to afford financial intermediation. Thus, creating a reciprocal relationship between the financial 
sector and economic growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). In evidence of the growth facilitating 
effect of intermediation, credit depth has shown to improve economic growth (Beck and Levine, 2004, 
Levine et al., 2000). Moreover, financial intermediation can facilitate growth by boosting 
technological innovation. This is achieved by financial intermediaries evaluating entrepreneurial 
projects and identifying the most promising ones. Funding of these projects is then mobilised by the 
financial sector (Blackburn and Hung, 1998, King and Levine, 1993). This has also been reflected 
empirically, as financial liberalisation has a positive impact on innovation for industries with high 
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external finance dependence (Moshirian, Tian, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015). Furthermore, credit depth 
seems to have a positive impact on innovative activity on the aggregate level (Ang, 2011).  
Regarding the other two functions: the monitoring of innovative activities by financial 
intermediaries create incentives for improved effort for entrepreneurs. As the monitoring improves, the 
financial intermediaries are also able to offer better products to entrepreneurs, thus encouraging 
innovation (De la Fuente and Marin, 1996). Moreover, the financial sector allows the possibility of 
risk management through diversification. Since investors are often risk adverse, risk management 
enables for more investments in high risk, high return project. In addition to improving the utility of 
investors, the shift towards the high risk, high return projects may facilitates growth, provided that 
these projects are more growth enhancing than low risk projects (Acemogulo and Zilibotti, 1997, 
Saint-Paul, 1991). The positive relationship between stock market development and economic growth 
has among others been reported by Beck and Levine (2004).  
It is clear that the financial sector provides a significant contribution to the long-term economic 
growth. This effect is transmitted through the two channels, capital accumulation and productivity 
growth (Andersson, Burzynska, and Opper, forthcoming, Bonfiglioli, 2008). Which of these channels 
that dominate, moreover, seems to depend on the level of income of the country, since the financial 
intermediation mainly facilitates growth in low income countries through the accumulation of capital 
and through productivity growth in high income countries (Rioja and Valev, 2004b).  
The contribution of finance, nevertheless, does not necessarily need to remain constant as the 
financial sector grows larger. In fact there are indications that the growth contribution of the financial 
sector has diminishing returns to scale (Masten, Coricelli, and Masten, 2008, Rioja and Valev 2004a). 
 
2.2 Negative Effects 
Taking it even further several authors have shown that the financial sector might start to have a 
negative impact when the credit depth becomes too large in proportion to GDP (Arcand et al. 2015, 
Law and Singh, 2014, Samargandi et al. 2015). It is thus apparent that something within the financial 
sector affects the aggregate in a negative way, and that this effect grows stronger the larger the 
financial sector becomes.  
A considerable amount of literature associates large financial sectors with economic instability 
and crises. For instance, when certain improbable risks are ignored by both investors and 
intermediaries, securities carrying these risks tend to be over-issued. When the risk is later discovered, 
investors try to exchange these securities for asset with less risk. Since the wealth of intermediaries 
usually is smaller than that of the investors, prices of the securities with risks drop when the investors 
rush to sell their risk bearing assets. Naturally this causes financial instability (Gennaioli et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, non-traditional banking activities such as securitisation, while profitable for banks in the 
short run, tend to increase the risk of bank crashes (DeYoung and Torna, 2013, Shleifer and Vishny, 
2010). Financial crises are, as is well known certainly not good for the banking sector, and they do 
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also often spill over to real sectors. Moreover, since the ramifications of a financial crash naturally get 
bigger when the size of the financial sector increases, it is possible that the growth mitigating aspects 
of finance are in fact the instability caused by it. The negative effect of too much finance is, however, 
robust even in times of financial stability (Arcand et al., 2015). A more plausible connection is 
therefore, as argued by de la Torre, Ize, and Schmukler, (2012, p. 25) “… the marginal benefits of 
financial development may at some point become smaller than the marginal cost of maintaining 
financial stability.” Beck, Degryse, and Kneer (2014), however, find that credit depth, while having 
little effect on economic growth, in fact mitigates economic volatility, putting the idea that the 
volatility of the financial sector lie behind the apparent possibility of an over-sized financial sector to 
doubt.  
By separating between credit allocated to firms and credit allocated to household, one might be 
able to find an alternative explanation to the non-monotonous relationship between credit depth and 
economic growth. Credit to enterprises and entrepreneurial activities is a productive form of credit. 
Household credit is also generally thought of as welfare enhancing since it allows for the redistribution 
of income over an individual’s lifetime. Lack of self-control can, however, cause household credit to 
decrease individual welfare and negatively affect the household savings rate (Laibson, 1997). 
Therefore, the allocation of credit between households and enterprises could very well matter for the 
long-term economic growth. Studies separating between firm credit and household credit have found 
that firm credit as expected facilitates growth. Household credit on the other hand has no effect on the 
long-term economic growth (Beck et al., 2012), and instead increases the risk of financial crises 
(Angeles, 2015). The risk enhancing effect of household credit is certainly concerning, and relating it 
to the findings of Beck et al. (2014) suggests that household credit could very well reduce the risk 
mitigating effect of enterprise credit. Moreover, the growth in the size of the financial sector over the 
past 100 years was in the US to a great extent driven by increases in household credit (Greenwood and 
Scharfstein, 2013). A growing importance of household credit and the seemingly non-existent effect of 
household credit on economic growth, could help explain the decreasing returns to scale of credit 
depth. The lack of a negative effect of household credit on economic growth does, nevertheless, make 
it unlikely that household credit lies behind the u-shaped relationship found between credit depth and 
economic growth.  
The non-monotonous relationship between finance and growth could also be a result of 
misallocation of labour. Misallocation builds upon the ideas of Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1991) stating that the social benefit of entrepreneurship at large depend on whichever of 
productive and unproductive activities are the most rewarding. Many financial activities are certainly 
not unproductive, there is, nonetheless, literature suggesting that the number of financiers may become 
inefficiently large due to excessive rents earned by the sector (e.g. Bolton et al., 2011, Philippon, 
2010, Würgler, 2009). To put it differently, a drain of labour and talent to the financial sector can 
occur if the income of the financial sector becomes too large relative to the income of other industries. 
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As a matter of fact, the relative wage of the financial sector has increased over the years for several 
developed countries (Boustanifar, Grant, and Reshef, 2014, Philippon and Reshef, 2013). In addition, 
a study of French engineers showed that finance has a premium to talent that has increased since the 
1980s (Célérier and Vallée, 2011).  
Sporadic evidence suggests that the wage premium found in finance indeed has worked as a 
force of attraction for labour. For example, careers in finance have become increasingly chosen by 
Harvard graduates (Goldin and Katz, 2008). Moreover, high wages in the financial sector have had a 
documented impact on cross-border migration of skilled workers to finance (Boustanifar et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, the skill intensity of the financial sector has increased in relation to the rest of the 
economy (Philippon and Reshef, 2013), indicating that the financial sector might attract skilled labour 
much needed in the innovative sectors. The increase of skill intensity of finance can, nonetheless, also 
be explained by the increased use of information and communication technology (Philippon and 
Reshnef, 2013), and by financial deregulation (Boustanifar et al. 2014, Philippon and Reshef, 2013).  
Skilled labour in the financial sector is, however, not necessarily bad. Skilled intermediaries can 
possibly better screen firms and entrepreneurs, thereby the allocation of credit should improve when 
the skill intensity in finance rises. Similarly, skilled financiers would most likely be better at 
monitoring enterprises and entrepreneurs than financiers with low levels of skill.  Nevertheless, the 
allocation of credit can only be improved up to a certain point, where the allocation is already optimal. 
Likewise, the monitoring activities can in theory reach a ceiling, since firms will be fully monitored. 
At these points, a greater skill intensity in finance will not be socially beneficial. Furthermore, the 
financial sector engages in activities with limited effect on economic growth such as asset trading, 
which by definition is a zero-sum game. These activities would also have use of skilled labour. It is 
therefore likely that skilled labour in the financial sector promotes growth but that this effect becomes 
smaller and smaller. Eventually, the drain of skill from innovative sectors will overcome these positive 
effects, making the marginal social benefit of skilled labour in finance, negative. 
Recent studies have shown that financial deregulation causes R&D intensive industries to grow 
slower (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015, Kneer, 2013a, Kneer, 2013b), and that the average wage of 
finance negatively affects the accumulation of patents (Ang, 2011). This indicates that innovative 
sectors are indeed hurt by skill increases in finance. The total effect on the aggregate level is, however, 
at large unexplored. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2013) show that productivity has a non-monotonous 
relationship with the employment share of the financial sector. To the author’s knowledge this is the 
only contribution, which calls for more research on the aggregate level, in order to be able to draw 
conclusions regarding the effect of misallocation of labour on the general equilibrium, which might 
appear as the financial sector grows too large. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
An oversized financial sector is more likely to be found in developed countries than in developing 
countries. For this reason the study is limited to the EU15 countries. Since, finance predominantly 
affects the growth of developed countries through productivity, both the GDP per capita growth and 
the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth are used as dependent variables. Furthermore, in total four 
proxy variables were used to measure the effect of the financial sector on growth, namely, the share of 
employment, the share of value added, the relative skill intensity, and the relative high skilled wage. 
These variables in addition to a number of control variables, were used in OLS panel regressions to 
test the hypothesis of the thesis. Variables for financial sector size were obtained from the EU KLEMS 
database. The time frame used, starts in 1970 and ends in 2007 for the variables the share of 
employment and the share of value added. For the relative skill intensity and the relative high skilled 
wage, the shorter time frame of 1985 to 2005 is used as a result of data limitations.  
 
3.1. The Model 
The two dependent variables, GDP per capita growth and TFP growth makes it possible to see where 
the size of the financial sector potentially has the strongest negative impact. A stronger effect on 
productivity, for instance, serves as an indication that the financial sector might drain human capital 
from innovative sectors. 
The first explaining variable used in this thesis is the share of employment of the financial 
sector. Albeit a crude measurement of the allocation of talent, it serves as a measurement of the size of 
the financial sector by its usage of labour relative to the rest of the economy. The negative aspect of 
using the share of employed in the financial sector, is that it does not account for changes in the skill 
composition of workers in the financial sector. The share of employment in the financial sector is 
defined for every country as the total number of persons engaged in the financial sector divided by the 
total number of persons engaged in the whole economy. 
The second explaining variable is the share of value added of the financial sector of the value 
added of the whole economy. This variable can be interpreted as the total income of the financial 
sector, i.e. the wage paid to workers plus the compensation to capital. It then represents the 
attractiveness of the financial sector for workers. Nonetheless, just as the case of the share of 
employed, this measurement is crude, as the compensation to capital is included. The share of value 
added is defined as the value added of the financial sector divided by the value added of the aggregate. 
Two more precise measurements of potential brain drain that are used in this thesis are, the skill 
intensity of the financial sector relative to the rest of the economy, and the relative high skilled wage 
of the financial sector. The disadvantage of using these two are the limited data available. The relative 
skill intensity measures rather accurately how much human capital is being used by the financial 
sector. A brain drain effect or a misallocation of talent should thus be observable through this variable. 
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The relative skill intensity is defined as the share of hours in the financial sector worked by high 
skilled labour, subtracted by the share of hours in the rest of economy worked by high skilled labour. 
The relative high skilled wage measures more precisely the force of attraction that the financial sector 
exerts on the high skilled population, than the variable share of value added. This enables us to 
pinpoint the effect of the financial sector’s wages on the whole economy. The relative high skilled 
wage is defined as the ratio between the average wage of high skilled labour in the financial sector and 
the average wage of the high skilled labour in the rest of the economy. By using in total four ways to 
measure brain drain, both directly by looking at the labour allocation, and indirectly through the 
income of the sector, a robustness check is performed automatically.  
There is strong evidence that the financial sector contributes positively to economic growth. 
When creating an econometric model for the effects of brain drain, this positive contribution must be 
taken into consideration. Therefore a linear term must be present in the regression. The negative 
effects of the financial sector due to the brain drain, should, nevertheless, eventually dominate the 
positive contribution, when the financial sector becomes too large. It is therefore likely that a quadratic 
term is the best way to model the misallocation of labour. 
To capture the evolution of the financial sector over time, in addition to differences between 
countries, panel data is used. Furthermore, since it is likely that the interaction between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables (e.g. that growth causes financial expansion in addition to 
financial expansion causing growth), all independent variables must be lagged one period. As follows, 
two models are used:   
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1)
2 + 𝜁𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the GDP per capita growth for country 𝑖 during time period 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are country 
specific and time specific effects respectively, 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is the independent financial sector variable tested, 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the two-way error component.  
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1)
2 + 𝜁𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (2) 
where the independent variable 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 stands for TFP growth.  
Regarding the vector of control variables, human capital, inflation, openness to trade, and 
government consumption are used. The usage of these variables and their relevance for growth is 
supported by, Acemogulo, (1996), Barro, (1991), Lucas, (1988), and Romer, (1990) in the case of 
human capital, by Fischer (1993), Eggoh and Khan (2014), and Bruno and Easterly (1998) when it 
comes to inflation, by Krugman (1979), Frankel and Romer (1999), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), 
Lucas, (1973), Jarrett and Selody (1982), Papapetrou, (2003) regarding the openness to trade, and 
finally by Barro , (1990, 1991) and Fölster and Henrekson, (2001), for the inclusion of government 
consumption. Human capital and the openness to trade are expected to be positively correlated with 
the dependent variables, while a negative correlation is expected to be found with inflation and 
government consumption.  
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Both models were regressed using three year averages for all variables to capture long term 
effects, but still retain a large number of observations. Especially, when the relative skill intensity and 
the relative high skilled wage are regressed and thus the shorter time span of 1985 to 2005 is used, five 
year averages gives too few observations. As can be seen in the models above all explaining variables 
were lagged one time period, in order to avoid simultaneity. In addition, all series were tested for the 
presence of a unit-root with the Levin-Lee-Shu test1, and all non-stationary time series were made 
stationary by taking the first difference. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistic was used to detect 
autocorrelation and the White test was used to detect heteroscedasticity. When autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, or both were detected, robust standard errors were used. Lastly the Jarque-Bera 
statistic was used to test for normality. 
   Note, however, that the usage of panel regressions and the inclusion of a quadratic term is not 
an absolute test for a u-shaped relationship. In fact the quadratic term could very well pick up a 
concave relationship of decreasing returns of scale. For that reason, the number of observations that 
exceeded the point of maximum with one standard deviation of the variable in question is used to 
differentiate between decreasing returns to scale and a u-shaped relationship. 
3.2. Data  
The EU KLEMS database was used for the explaining variables (see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) 
for details on the methods used in creating the database). Data for the dependent variables: GDP per 
capita growth and TFP growth, were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and Penn World Tables respectively. Regarding sources for the control variables, WDI was 
used for openness to trade, and government consumption, data on inflation was found through IMF, 
and Barro and Lee (2010) provided data on the average years of education. 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regressions. Table 2 presents 
an overview of the variables for the allocation of skill and labour as well as income of the financial 
sector. As can be seen in table 2, Luxembourg has by far the highest value in the share of employed by 
the financial sector, and the share of value added in 2007. Furthermore, no countries have negative 
values of relative skill intensity in 2005, which means that the financial sector employed more skilled 
labour in terms of hours relative to the rest of the economy. Similarly, only Greece has in 2005 a lower 
average high skilled wage than the rest of the economy, as shown by their value of relative high 
skilled wage below one. This raises the concern that too much skilled human capital is allocated to the 
financial sector, and that the attraction force of finance for high skilled labour is too high. 
                                                     
1 See the appendix for the test and test results 
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3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Growth, productivity, and the allocation of labour and income 
The effect of the share of employed can be seen in table 3. Regression (1) and (2) represent the effect 
on GDP per capita growth. In both regressions, neither the linear nor the quadratic term of the share of 
employed are independently significant. They are, however, jointly significant in regression (2), and 7 
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observations are one standard deviation above the threshold. The outlier Luxembourg is removed in 
table 6 (see the appendix). This improves the significance of the individual terms on the effect on GDP 
per capita growth, indicating that Luxembourg might be somewhat disruptive to the sample. The lack 
of joint significance in regression (2) and the lack of observations one standard deviation above 
optimal, makes it however not possible to rule out that the relationship between GDP per capita 
growth and the share of employed is diminishing, instead of u-shaped.  
Regression (5) and (6) in table 3 show the effect the share of employed has on TFP growth. As 
can be seen in regression (5) only the quadratic term is significant at the 10% level, when most control 
variables are omitted. In regression (6) all control variables are present and the linear term is 
significant at the 10% level, and the quadratic at the 5% level. Jointly, nonetheless, both regressions 
show significance at the 5% level. Again 7 observations exceed the threshold with more than one 
standard deviation. All of those belong to Luxembourg. This raises the concern that the indications of 
a u-shaped relationship are driven by this outlier. As can be seen in table 6 this proves to be true. The 
turning point is significantly lowered from 6 percentage points to around 3 percentage points. Despite 
this, no observations exceed the turning point sufficiently to eliminate the possibility that the 
relationship is simply diminishing.  
Regarding the effect of the share of employed in the financial sector, it can be concluded that it 
has a positive effect on the GDP per capita growth that diminishes as the financial sector becomes too 
big. The regressions do, nonetheless, lack individual significance when the full sample is used, and 
joint significance when Luxembourg is omitted. Therefore, the results are not very strong. More can 
be said about the effect of finance on TFP growth. It is clear that the financial sector has a positive 
impact on productivity up until it has absorbed certain share of the labour force. After this point, the 
marginal effect of the financial sector seems to disappear.  
Concerning of the share of value added of the financial sector, its effect on GDP per capita 
growth and TFP growth, can be seen in table 3. None of the terms of the share of value added show 
individual significance, and only regression (3) shows joint significance. Similar results are found 
when removing the outlier Luxembourg in table 5. Hence, it can be concluded that changes in the rate 
of change of the share of value added of the financial sector can neither describe changes in economic 
growth, nor productivity growth.  
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3.3.2. Growth, productivity, and the allocation of skill and wages 
Table 4 presents regressions of the relative skill intensity and the relative high skilled wage. 
Regressions (1) and (2) show the effect the relative skill intensity has on GDP per capita growth. The 
linear term is significant at the 0.1% level for both regressions, while the quadratic term is significant 
at the 10% level in the regression where most control variables are omitted, and at the 5% level when 
they are all present. Furthermore, both regressions show joint significance. The regressions indicate 
that too much skill is allocated to the financial sector, when the rate of change of the relative skill 
intensity is approximately 21-25 percentage points. This is a very high rate of change, and naturally no 
observations exceed the thresholds with more than one standard deviation. Table 7 in the appendix 
show the regressions omitting Spain. The quadratic term loses its individual significance but the joint 
significance remains. The turning point is also increased somewhat. The relationship between 
economic growth and the rate of change of the relative skill intensity thus seems to be that of 
diminishing returns to scale. The turning point is however so high, that little can be said about the 
effect as the rate of change in a country approaches this level. 
The effect of the relative skill intensity on TFP growth is shown in regressions (5) and (6). Here 
only the linear term stays significant at the 5% level, while the quadratic term is consistently 
individually insignificant. Jointly only regression (6) show significance. In table 7, Spain has been 
removed, which does not affect the terms’ individual significance. The joint significance is, however, 
improved, and the turning point is lowered to around 21 percentage units, resulting in several countries 
having values of skill intensity above it. Due to the turning point being very high, it can only be 
concluded that the contribution of the relative skill intensity decreases as the rate of change increases. 
The effect of the relative high skilled wage on the economic growth is shown in regressions (3) 
and (4) in table 4. The terms are jointly significant when all control variables are included. This result 
is, nonetheless, not robust when only the variable Education is included. Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera 
statistic indicates that the error term is not normally distributed. When Luxembourg is omitted as in 
table 7, all significance disappears. The effect of the relative high skilled wage is thus not robust on 
GDP per capita growth. 
Similarly, when regressing the relative high skilled wage on TFP growth, the joint significance 
disappears when most control variables are excluded. Moreover, the significance disappears when 
Luxembourg is no longer included. Therefore the effect on TFP growth is not robust either.  
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3.2.3. Causes and implications 
The financial sector in terms of skill and labour certainly has an impact on the aggregate. This impact 
is found to be positive, but decreases as the financial sector absorbs more and more human capital. It 
cannot be concluded that the effect of the financial sector eventually becomes negative, which leads to 
the conclusion that the negative effects of finance does not dominate the positive effects. 
The non-monotonous relationship with TFP growth is, however, stronger than the relationship is 
with GDP per capita growth, especially when the share of employed is used. The reason why the 
impact is stronger on TFP growth is most likely that the negative impact of the drain of personnel from 
innovative sectors is more strongly reflected here. After all, innovations should mainly affect the 
productivity of the economy unless completely new markets are created as a result. The negative 
impact on productivity is probably to some extent outweighed by the contribution of finance in capital 
allocation and accumulation when looking at GDP per capita growth. If the effect of finance on capital 
accumulation is linear and positive, it should mitigate the negative effect of the misallocation of 
labour, thus possibly making the effect on GDP per capita less significant.  
The effect of the financial sector is seen much more clearly when using the share of employed 
than when using the relative skill intensity. This is somewhat unexpected considering that the relative 
skill intensity is a much finer instrument when estimating the allocation of talent in the economy. The 
time frame used for the relative skill intensity is, nonetheless, different from the one used when 
regressing the share of employed. The regressions using the share of employed were for that reason 
remade using the shorter time frame of 1985-2005 as can be seen in table 8. Compared to the results 
presented in table 3 and table 6, the regressions using the shorter time frame have to a greater extent 
individually insignificance. The results using the share of employed remains stronger than when using 
the relative skill intensity, which leads to the conclusion that the time frame does not lie behind the 
difference in strength. The number of observations is in all regressions larger for the share of 
employed. It is possible that this is the reason for the sparse significance of the regressions with the 
relative skill intensity, since a low number of observations makes it harder to distinguish the 
regression coefficients from zero. Another possible explanation is that the variable share of employed 
to the financial sector picks up the overall size effect of private credit reported by among others 
Arcand et al. (2015) and Samargandi et al. (2015). This would not be surprising as the share of 
employed is in fact a measurement of the size of the financial sector. The diminishing relationship 
found when using the relative skill intensity, does, nonetheless, confirm that the size effect does not 
solely drive the relationship between the share of employed and productivity, and that misallocation of 
labour must play some role in explaining the non-monotonous contribution of financial sector size. 
The effect of the financial sector in terms of the share of value added and the relative high 
skilled wage, seems to be robustly non-existent. The relative high skilled wage showed some 
significance, however, this result is treated as false, since no other regressions trying to capture the 
impact of income portrayed this effect.  
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The difference in ability to explain the aggregate between income variables and skill variables 
might seem puzzling at first. One might assume that high wages in a particular sector would attract 
labour to that sector, and because of this, changes in employment should mirror changes in wages. 
Changes in the labour and skill variables do not necessarily correspond to changes in the income 
proxies, however, which makes it unlikely that changes in income can explain changes in labour 
allocation or skill composition. Therefore, the proxies for income do most likely not measure the same 
thing as the proxies for labour. Nevertheless, this does not mean that high wages in finance do not 
attract labour. As can be seen in table 2, the relative high skilled wage has been above one for most 
countries, meaning that there has been a wage premium for skilled labour in finance. Over time this 
wage premium will have attracted skilled labour from other sectors, raising the relative skill intensity 
of the financial sector. Thus, changes in the relative skill intensity have most likely been brought about 
by the existence of a wage premium, rather than changes in relative income.  
The relationship between income and labour of a sector could also go the other way. When the 
employment share of a sector goes up, one would naturally assume that the output share of that sector 
would follow. As can be seen in table 2, the share of value added has in fact decreased for some 
countries, while the share of employment has increased. This suggests that the financial sector, while 
occupying more of the labour force in all countries, does not seem to generate more value relative to 
the total economy. This coupled with the results in this thesis regarding the non-monotonous effect of 
employment and skill in the financial sector, and the absence of an effect of income, clearly indicates 
that the financial sector might be overcrowded in some countries. Put differently, more and more 
labour and skill is allocated to the financial sector, which creates little value for the industry and does 
not contribute towards productivity growth. The lack of value created by more workers in finance 
could be related to increased asset trading. Asset trading is by definition a zero-sum game, since the 
profit of one trader comes at a loss of others. Hence, it is likely that if the financial sector expands due 
to asset trading, the industry aggregate sees no increase in income, and thus that the labour would 
socially be better allocated elsewhere. Individual firms with skilled traders can, nonetheless, benefit 
from more asset trading. An example of the growing importance of asset trading can be found in the 
USA (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013).  
The results of this thesis, suggests that the financial sector has diminishing returns to scale. This 
calls for a re-evaluation of the impact of finance and that policies be considered to limit the expansion 
of the financial sector. If asset trading lies behind the increased labour usage and the allocation of skill, 
stricter regulation could limit the size of the financial sector. This kind of policy could, however, have 
unwanted complications, as reduced asset trading could have a negative impact on the liquidity of 
stock markets. In turn a reduction of the liquidity of the stock markets could negatively affect 
economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998). Another policy to be considered is the taxing of the 
financial sector. The effects of taxation could very well depend on the origin of the positive 
externalities of innovation. If the externalities are driven by physical capital, taxation of the financial 
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sector could potentially reduce economic growth, since less capital would be generated. If they instead 
are driven by human capital, taxation will increase economic growth by reducing the amount of talent 
allocated to the financial sector (Philippon, 2010). Considering that the financial sector has a stronger 
negative impact on productivity growth, the latter seems more feasible. Thus, a heavier taxation of the 
financial sector could be in order. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to both confirm and explain the u-shaped relationship between financial 
sector size and economic growth recently found by several authors (e.g. Arcand, et al. 2015). This was 
accomplished by using proxies for the allocation of labour to the financial sector, then regressing both 
linear and quadratic terms of the proxies on economic and productivity growth. The regressions 
indicate a robust positive but diminishing contribution of the skill and labour usage of finance on 
productivity growth. A u-shaped relationship can, nevertheless, not be established. This indicates that 
the aggregate indeed benefits from financial sector usage of human capital. This effect declines, 
however, as the financial sector absorbs more and more labour and talent, up to the point where the 
effect on the aggregate disappears. The strong effect on productivity suggests that the financial sector 
absorption of labour mainly harms innovative sectors, which previously has been documented in firm-
level studies (Kneer, 2013a, 2013b, Cecchetti and Kharoubi, 2015). The diminishing relationship is, 
found to be weaker when regressing on GDP per capita growth. This implies that skill and labour 
accumulation in the financial sector facilitates growth by achieving a more efficient allocation of 
capital, and that this function mitigates the negative aspects of misallocation.  
Overall, we can see that the financial sector can become large enough for its contribution to 
disappear. The marginal effect of financial sector labour usage does, nonetheless, not become 
negative, which indicates that the negative aspects of finance (e.g. brain drain from innovative sectors) 
never become larger than the positive effects.  
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